A former D3 soccer player at Wesleyan University, Emmett McConnell is in his fourth year of MLS coverage. As a beat writer for Prost Amerika, Emmett has covered the Philadelphia Union predominantly, but also spent time reporting on the Chicago Fire and Los Angeles FC. He has also written for the Citizen in South Africa, reporting on the Premier Soccer League.
The Portland Timbers lifted the MLS is Back trophy this summer, and as fall approaches it’s time to look back on how the Timbers pulled off this victory.
In this video, I look at how the Timbers outplayed their opponents despite an overwhelming lack of possession.
The main points of focus are how the Timbers set up defensively to stifle the opponent, how they counter attacked, how they played with the ball when the opponent was sitting deep, how they pressed high up the field on occasion, and how they executing four goals off of set pieces in the last two games.
Sebastian Blanco is a main focus of this video, and with the Argentine winger out with an ACL injury, Portland will surely have to change tactics should they want to make a similar run in MLS Cup later this fall.
The Union’s press was at its best against D.C. United, as Philadelphia moved back into first place in the Eastern Conference.
After back-to-back 4-0 drubbings on the road, the Philadelphia Union bounced back into form with a 5-1 win at Audi Field.
The biggest problem recently for Philadelphia was its mercurial nature on the road.
The Union are now 2-1-3 in its last six road matches, conceding four
goals to New York City FC, Real Salt Lake, and the Montreal Impact. For
the most part, the Union were underwhelming in those losses.
The two wins also came with an asterisk, as the Union got to play
D.C. and Orlando for more than 45 minutes against 10 men due to red
cards.
But even before the red card to Junior Moreno in the 40th minute, the
Union were better than D.C., despite missing a penalty kick. (The Union
are now 3 for 7 converting penalties, the worst in MLS and only team to
convert under 50 percent of penalties.)
The Union amassed 16 first half shots against D.C. United, and went into the half with two goals and a man advantage.
Because of the massive adjustments Ben Olsen was forced to make after
the red card and Chris Durkin’s injury, we’ll focus only on the first
40 minutes and how the two sides fared at full strength.
Each team’s formation ended up being vital in dictating how it would play, and where it would try to isolate opponents.
D.C. United lined up with a 3-4-3, while the Union played a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield.
D.C. had the chance to create overloads in wide areas, whether on the
right side with Leonardo Jara and Paul Arriola vs. Kai Wagner.
Cover would have to come from Warren Creavalle or Aurelien Collin,
and whether it was Colin or Creavalle sliding to help, an opening would
be created.
If Collin steps over, Rooney should easily make a splitting run
between the center backs, and at least draw Jack Elliott out of position
and create a gap in the middle.
If Creavalle steps over, which is what the Union prefers from its wide midfielders, there should be more space in the midfield.
The situation was the same on the left side with Lucas Rodriguez and Lucho Acosta trying to overload Ray Gaddis.
Teams playing against the Union can make the most out of
Philadelphia’s aggressive pressing by playing the ball into wide areas
and forcing Creavalle and Bedoya to shuffle wide to the opposing
wingback. D.C. benefits because either the Union midfielders wear down
quickly, or Haris Medunjanin gets isolated in the midfield.
Unfortunately, D.C. were unable to take advantage of its advantage on the wings.
The other position where D.C. – and even the Union – looked to created space was with the front three attackers.
Rooney, Acosta and Arriola had the additional defensive duties of covering their two-man midfield, and were unable to get behind the Union midfield, and ideally play three versus four against the Union back line.
D.C. struggled to step up from the back, which would have allowed D.C.’s forward three to have more freedom.
United was also unable to clear beyond the Union press and find the forwards in advanced positions and initiate counter attacks.
The
Union, like usual, opted to press D.C. and attempted to force these
clearances through the middle where Medunjanin and company could pick up
the loose ball.
Compared to recent losses, Philadelphia has improved on knowing when
to press: how to hunt in packs, and how to not expose themselves once
the press was beaten.
In previous years, and even certain games this season, Philadelphia pressed haphazardly or individually, and wily opponents took advantage (the opener against Toronto and recent loss to NYCFC are good examples.)
The
key for the press was the Union outnumbering D.C. in the midfield. The
two Union strikers pressed the three D.C. center backs, while Marco
Fabian was free to cover either center midfielders, Moreno or Durkin.
The weak-sided midfielder then tucked in to stick to the other center midfielder. The near-sided midfielder then moved out to rush the outlet to the wing backs of Jara, Rodriguez and Moreno.
The Union forwards pressing the D.C. defense wasn’t revolutionary or necessarily a difficult tactic to counter, however, it did lead to the first Union goal.
Once
D.C. cleared past the pressure and the Union sent the ball back, the
front three for Philadelphia were then able to get enough space for
three-on-three situations.
The biggest issue D.C. had in defending the Union was that the center backs sat off too deep.
Often, the three center defenders would be just yards from their own goal, and invited shots from range. The Union capitalized on the first goal, and a large percentage of the 16 first half shots came from D.C. giving Union players too much room to shoot.
It was really unfortunate that this match had a red card, as Ben Olsen would have had to make adjustments at half time.
D.C. is a much better squad than the scoreline suggested, and the second half could have been a much closer affair.
This short-lived but growing rivalry is always a good match, especially because of how different the two teams want to play.
Atlanta United under Frank de Boer looks for slow build up, looking for the right moment to strike, while the New York Red Bulls want to press the opponent into making a mistake high up the field.
Take a look at the video to see how I break down the match.
(This is a column of my observations and interpretations of trends in world soccer.)
Around world soccer, the value of a true attacking midfielder (10, CAM, trequartista, whatever you want to call it) has dropped as has the number of teams that play with an attacking midfielder.
In the span of the last decade, players such as Wesley Sneijder, Mesut Ozil, Mario Goetze, Shinji Kagawa, Oscar and many more have gone from elite caliber to either obscurity or derision.
Meanwhile, others such as David Silva, Kevin De Bruyne, Juan Mata, Phillipe Coutinho, James Rodriguez, Roberto Firmino, and Paolo Dybala have had to redefine their own game to either fit into a position deeper in midfield or on the wing.
Formations like the 4-3-1-2 and more commonly the 4-2-3-1 were widely adopted as a multipurpose system that could work in possession and on the counter attack, and both relied on the keystone in the center of it all, the attacking midfielder.
It perhaps reached its peak through coaches such as Jose Mourinho at Porto (03/04 Champions League winners), Chelsea (11/12 though not under Mourinho), Inter Milan (09/10) and Real Madrid and Jurgen Klopp at Borussia Dortmund (12-13 runner up).
The 4-2-3-1 became a counter to the dominant 4-3-3 played by Barcelona and Bayern Munich sides earlier in the decade and century, under Pep Guardiola.
The formation seemed to lose favor in the past five years, potentially due to the rise of three and five man defenses made popular in Italy and later at Chelsea under Antonio Conte.
Now, most teams seem to line up in either a 4-3-3 or 5-3-2/3-5-2. Last year in the English Premier League only Everton, Leicester City and Fulham lined up with a #10 on a consistent basis. Meanwhile the top six teams all played either a 4-3-3 or 5-3-2 or some variant.
Even teams that played with personnel that suited attacking midfielders tended to place them in positions in a different formation.
David Silva and Kevin De Bruyne at Manchester City learned to play deeper in something more akin to an eight, or box-to-box role. Ross Barkley, who was a 10 at Everton before his transfer to Chelsea, also played deeper in the three-man midfield.
Roberto Firmino, who played attacking midfield for Hoffenheim, is pushed forward into somewhat of a striker or false nine under Jurgen Klopp.
The 10 is no longer in demand in soccer, though the traits that many of the best 10s possess can often transition to other positions on the field.
Many 10s lack the physical size and defensive work rate that would have suited them for a deeper position in the midfield, while others lack the pace and pure dribbling ability to play on the wing, and others don’t have the similar physical or mental traits to be a primary or secondary striker.
But why was this change necessary? So many great players are limited by their skills to one position, what made this one obsolete?
First, it is important to understand the role of the 10. Create and score goals is the obvious answer, but on a deeper level, it was to position between the defense and midfielders. The ideal 10 would consistently be able to control the ball, turn, and run at the opposing defense before making a shot or pass, all while under pressure from back-tracking midfielders.
This role has gone out of fashion for two reasons.
First, that it can be done in other ways. It doesn’t have to be a player whose only role is to get between the lines. Many strikers now can both stretch the field and come short and receive the ball. Luis Suarez is one such example of a player who thrives at getting behind defenses, but is also a menace when running at defenders with the ball.
The inverted winger has become much more common in the absence of attacking midfielders, and it is often the best way to get into that pocket of space. Lionel Messi, Cristiano Ronaldo, Eden Hazard, Neymar, all among the best players in the world, and all are inverted wingers that can cut onto the inside and cause havoc in the middle, while also being a threat to push the ball with pace down the line. By forcing a player centrally, suddenly they lose the wide threat, while also losing significantly more space when receiving the ball.
Of course deeper-lying midfielders can do this job while also taking on more rigorous defensive responsibilities.
I’ve already mentioned how it worked at Man City, Liverpool and Chelsea. But most teams that play with three midfielders rely on one or both of them to be able to power dribble past opposing mid-fields and get into that position without having to start further up the pitch– Pogba, Matuidi, Kovacic, Ramsey, Emre Can, Leon Goretzka, Vidal and Arthur come to mind as deeper-lying midfielders on top teams who possess this trait.
Second is the role of the defensive midfielder.
The defensive midfielder, or the 6, has been tasked with a greater creative responsibility in recent years. Tack on the fact that the defensive responsibility is still huge, and it has quickly become one of the most important positions.
Sergio Busquets at Barcelona is always the first to come to mind for me as one of these players. He dictates how the team plays and at what pace, and also is needed to cut out attacks before it can reach the back line.
Others that have reached that level are Fernandinho at Man City (think about how many times a pundit has mentioned how poor City are without him), Ngolo Kante at Chelsea (we could talk about whether he is a defensive midfielder all day, he isn’t, though he fits here), Nemanja Matic at Chelsea and now Man United, Casemiro at Real Madrid, Fabinho at Liverpool, Miralem Pjanic at Juventus, and Thiago at Bayern Munich.
These players have made it difficult to play as a 10. Often if a 10 goes missing in a match, its because the opposing defensive midfielder keeps him quiet. Fabinho against Messi at Anfield in the Champions League semifinals is one of the best representations of this. Messi struggled to find the ball and play in progressive positions, because Fabinho was so good in the midfield.
This challenge paired with the fact that three other positions can do the same job but take on other responsibilities, it makes sense that the 10 is not as valuable today.
But that takes us to the U.S., where MLS actively plays and promotes its 10s.
A cursory glance reveals that only about eight teams don’t play with a 10 though one could easily argue that a few of those do in fact play with a traditional 10 (Moralez at NYC and Amaya or Cruz at Cincinnati come to mind.)
LAFC is the best example of a team succeeding without a 10, but the other teams are Vancouver (12th), San Jose (5th), Sporting KC (10th), and in the east, NYC FC (5th), Montreal (6th) and Orlando (9th), Cincinnati (12th). San Jose and NYC will probably continue to rise in the standings, but the teams playing without a 10 aren’t exactly dominating the league.
To the conscious viewer of both MLS and European soccer, it would appear that MLS is behind the curve when it comes to these kinds of tactical decisions.
Unfortunately, it isn’t that easy.
MLS is indeed a new league – just over 25 years old. However, it isn’t exactly a league that is trailing behind the world. The long attached “retirement league” epithet is finally starting to fade.
Zlatan Ibrahimovic, Wayne Rooney and Bastian Schweinsteiger are the only names that could fit that label, but Ibrahimovic joined after scoring 25 goals in 39 appearances with Manchester United, and Rooney joined after scoring 12 goals for Everton from a midfield position. Schweinsteiger is a more difficult case as he plays defensive midfield and center back, but also more closely fits that label after being relegated to playing with the youth team in his time at Manchester United.
A big reason why the 10 is still so valued in MLS is exactly that, the value tied up in them.
Every team wants a big name creative midfielder who can create a second of magic with a shot or pass.
Alejandro Pozuelo ($3.8M), Nicolas Lodeiro ($2.5M), Diego Valeri ($2.4M), Carles Gil ($2.3M), Marco Fabian ($2.3M), Nicolas Gaitan ($2.3M), Albert Rusnak ($2M), Maxi Moralez ($2M), Darwin Quintero ($1.75M), Ezequiel Barco ($1.4M), Federico Higuain ($1.1M), Sacha Kljestan ($1.1M) (Shkelzen Gashi ($1.6M), Yura Movsisyan ($2.3M) Giovanni Dos Sanots ($6.5) no longer play in MLS but are still paid their contracts), are all in the top 50 highest paid players on the MLS payroll.
Most of the list is made up of strikers, attacking midfielders and wingers, with a spattering of big name defenders, midfielders and goalkeepers.
While big European teams have discovered more success playing with an attacking midfielder, MLS hasn’t.
MLS has stuck to the 10s not only because they are big names that can put buts in seats, but also because most if not all have the traits to play other positions as needed.
Higuain, Quintero, Pozuelo, Fabian, and Valeri are five that more closely resemble a second striker in their play style. They tend to get in the box and finish like most strikers, but drop deeper to pick up the ball. In the case of Higuain, Quintero and Valeri, their clubs’ 4-2-3-1 ends up resembling a 4-4-2 in defense, in which case they also defend like a striker. But on offense, most of these players have positional freedom. Some like Valeri and Pozuelo might drift wide, while others like Higuain and Fabian stay centrally.
Kljestan, Moralez, Rusnak and Gil are four that more closely resemble center midfielders. In fact, all have had to play in a deeper midfield position at some point this year for their clubs. They have not shirked from defensive responsibilities and have the passing range to distribute from deeper positions. Moralez is an interesting case, as he switches between playing as a midfielder and a second striker in Domenic Torrent’s system at NYC FC.
Meanwhile, Gaitan, Barco and Lodeiro are three that play more like wide midfielders, and often do play there for club and country. Gaitan was a former winger who has played centrally for Veljko Paunovic in Chicago. Barco is better as a center attacking midfielder, but as he often has had to compete with Pity Martinez and Miguel Almiron in Atlanta. He even played on the wing for Argentina at the U-20 World Cup this summer.
Nico Lodeiro is similar to Diego Valeri in that both players tend to drift wide from a central position and create opportunities away from the center of the field. He even played left midfield with Uruguay at the Copa America, but he tends to perform at his best when starting centrally and moving wide on his own accord.
A deeper look shows us that while the 10 is alive and well in MLS, most who play in that position are more versatile than the likes of Ozil or Sneijder, who never truly adapted to a new role. If any of their respective MLS clubs decided to switch from a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-1-2, all of these players have the traits and abilities to transition to playing striker, winger or central midfield.
It just happens that these stars are all at their best in a traditional 10, and until that role is deemed less valuable, it probably won’t go anywhere.
While not the highest paid players in the league, I also wanted to point out Marc Rzatkowski, Tomas Martinez, Pity Martinez, Frankie Amaya, Favio Alvarez, Paxton Pomykal, and Cole Basset as other 10s in the league and ones that play not because they are expensive, or because they are big names (except maybe Pity), but because that is how they are best utilized for their respective teams.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that MLS isn’t at the level of the top leagues in Europe. It is unfair to constantly compare MLS to the Premier League or La Liga.
The players that come into MLS as attacking midfielders tend to be of a higher level than that of the rest of the league. This is why there are so many who are highly paid, and why we play Lodeiro, Pity, Barco and Rusnak as 10s despite the fact that they play in other positions for their national teams or former club teams. These are players that can play attacking midfield at MLS level, where it would likely be too difficult to do so at a higher level.
There is nothing wrong with acknowledging that MLS is behind many other leagues. In fact, understanding that can help the league grow, and discover where money should be spent.
In the past three years, more money has been spent on developing other positions like defensive midfield, where players such as Jan Gregus, Haris Medunjanin, Eduard Atuesta, Everton Luiz, Eric Remedi, Junior Moreno, Saphir Taider, and Leonardo Bertone have made huge impacts for their team since joining the league.
Maybe as more money is invested in midfielders, the impact of an attacking midfield will lessen, and as the league develops this will certainly eventually happen, but there is no reason to force trends on MLS if it doesn’t actually improve the product on the field or more importantly a teams’ results.
Emmett and Erik discuss all that is happening in the world of international soccer including the Women’s World Cup, U-20 World Cup, Copa America, U-21 European Championships, African Cup of Nations, and of course the Gold Cup.
In this episode of the American Soccer Show, Emmett and Erik discuss the latest news in American soccer, and preview everything you need to know about the Gold Cup.
Mexico is without several of its biggest stars, Costa Rica is in flux after a poor World Cup in 2018, and a few poor results has the USMNT scrambling.
Is this summer a chance for an outsider to make a move on the three dominant sides?
Perhaps Jamaica can seal the deal after reaching back-to-back Gold Cup finals, or maybe Canada can finally find the limelight in a confederation in chaos.
In this episode, I break down the 3-2 Union victory over the New York Red Bulls.
The Union set up to try and control the match, and looked strong until a couple of Red Bull counters put the visitors ahead at the half.
Ilsinho came on and made a big impact, but this episode will focus mainly on midfield runs.
Kaku scored the first with a deep run past the Union midfield, and Jamiro Monteiro repaid the favor with one of his own.
I’ll also look at how Ilsinho was able to get by his man and draw defenders away from their positions, which created openings for both his team mates and himself to exploit.
MLS is one of the few soccer leagues in the world that can pride itself on parity, but is there a chance that parity is dwindling.
Other than the anomaly of Leicester City winning in 2015, the Premier League usually has the same “top six” competing for Champions League places. In the past ten years, only Chelsea, Manchester United, Leicester City, and Manchester City have won the league.
The same goes in all of the top leagues. Spain has only had three teams win the league in the past ten years – Barcelona, Real Madrid and Atletico Madrid – and is dominated by those three teams year after year.
The German Bundesliga and Serie A are even worse.
Juventus has won Serie A, and Bayern Munich the Bundesliga, for seven straight years.
The last team to win Serie A that wasn’t Milan, Inter Milan, or Juventus was Roma in 2001. While in Germany only Borussia Dortmund has challenged and won the title in the past 10 years.
But MLS is different.
Looking just at the regular season tables, as they are the best direct comparison to a European league, it’s clear that teams at the top don’t always stay there.
In the Western Conference, six teams have finished in first: Sporting Kansas City, Portland Timbers x2, FC Dallas x2, Seattle Sounders, San Jose Earthquakes, LA Galaxy x3.
(Kansas City swapped from the east to the west for the 2015 season.)
In the Eastern Conference, only five teams have finished in first over the past ten years: the New York Red Bulls x5, Toronto FC, DC United, Sporting Kansas City x2, and the Columbus Crew.
Combining the two conferences, seven teams have won a Supporters’ Shield – New York Red Bulls x3, Toronto FC, FC Dallas, Seattle Sounders, San Jose Earthquakes, LA Galaxy x2, and the Columbus Crew – though only twice has a team won the Shield and MLS Cup, Toronto in 2017 and the Galaxy in 2011.
MLS, like many U.S. leagues, was designed so that an upper echelon didn’t develop.
Salary caps, draft picks, and the single-entity structure ensure an even playing field for each team, granted that they actively seek out success.
That bubble, however, could burst soon.
As MLS continues to grow (we’re at what, MLS 4.0 now?) so does its competitive structure.
A recent report showed that MLS had the seventh highest revenue among soccer leagues world wide, behind the top five European leagues and the Brazilian league.
Despite the revenue, MLS spends just 28 percent of its revenue on player compensation, the other top leagues in the world spend between 52 and 72 percent of their revenue on player salaries.
The single-entity structure allows MLS to retain its money, and prevent it from going directly to players, but with the Collective Bargaining Agreement set to expire at the end of this year, there could be big changes on the horizon.
The league minimum is one item up for discussion, among others that are meant to improve quality of life and raise the competition in the league.
Player representatives want the league minimum to increase to $100,000, while other changes could be made that make it easier for players to negotiate for money on their second and third contract negotiations.
Many of the current rules were made to protect the clubs, so that talent could be attracted to the league, but as a result, U.S. players couldn’t demand exorbitant fees for their craft.
If MLS does change its CBA to allow its developing stars to earn more with subsequent contract negotiations, it will surely lead to higher average wage in the league, and result in a higher salary cap.
The rule was originally meant to protect a league that was in its infancy. Currently MLS is beyond even childhood, and is closer to a middle schooler, rapidly developing into its adult form and full of angst.
As players become more expensive in the future, clubs will have to made more difficult decisions. Do they start spending rapidly as more money comes into the league, or retain the current spending habits? Do they accept mediocrity, or push early to become an elite team?
In just the past few years we have seen teams that are willing to spend a lot of money to instantly be a winning club. Atlanta United (9th highest wage bill in MLS with $11,306,330.49), LAFC ($13,432,052.68), and New York City FC ($14,147,632.75) have all entered the league as teams to be feared though early, extravagant spending. Meanwhile, clubs such as the LA Galaxy ($17,502,008.29), Toronto FC ($26,167,498.69), and Seattle Sounders ($11,376,125.36) are established teams that have shown a desire to spend big bucks so as to be consistently challenging for top of the league. (Wages are reported from May 2018.)
Likewise there are teams that are hesitant to spend, and a gap has already started to develop between these two groups, with a couple of exceptions.
The Philadelphia Union ($8,915,987.84), New England Revolution ($6,818,556.10), Houston Dynamo ($5,673,471.62), San Jose Earthquakes ($7,787,252.57) and Columbus Crew ($6,971,083.47) have struggled to stay relevant in the playoff picture while these big teams continue to outspend them. (Columbus has done exceptionally well despite its low budget).
Some, like the Union, FC Dallas ($9,333,819.28) and New York Red Bulls ($7,689,313.93), have found ways to compete against those with massive spending.
These teams have started investing money in facilities and youth academies (and aren’t the only ones to develop elite academies and facilities.)
Already, the Red Bulls have products bearing fruit such as Tyler Adams, who left for RB Leipzig for $3 million.
Meanwhile FC Dallas has played eight homegrown players this season (Reggie Cannon, Edwin Cerillo, Jesus Ferreira, Jesse Gonzalez, Paxton Pomykal, Bryan Reynolds, Thomas Roberts, Brandon Servania) and given starts to six.
The Union, likewise, have had its academy grow quickly in a very short time, with two homegrown players consistently starting (Brenden Aaronson and Auston Trusty) and another two in Poland with the U-20 team (Mark McKenzie and Matt Real who join Pomykal and Servania).
An added bonus to investing in an academy system is that all homegrown players do not count toward the salary cap, so teams can spend elsewhere.
But let’s reel it in for a second. Increased salary cap will certainly lead to big spenders buying more, but won’t force the little guys to spend as well, as many teams aren’t even close to the cap just yet.
That could certainly lead to more disparity in the league, but it appears that a few of the cheaper teams are happy to find talent in other ways.
After all, the Red Bulls has been one of the consistent regular season performers from the past ten years.
But it greatly affects the MLS Superdraft, an institution that is the primary entry to the league for most U.S. sports leagues.
In football or basketball, a franchise that performs poorly is rewarded with good draft picks. Eventually that team will stock up on some of the most talented players entering the league.
With the academy system on the rise, young players are less likely to star in college and get drafted to the most recent Wooden Spoon winner. Instead they can sign on with teams at an early age and make the jump to first team soccer when the team decides they are ready.
With the two avenues of player entry to the league – purchasing from other leagues and academy products – overtaking the Superdraft as the best way to choose players, those that finish bottom get no tangible reward.
The Union didn’t pick a single player in this draft, and of the 24 picks in the fourth round, 13 teams passed on a selection. Eight passed on a selection in the third round.
Drafts are simply a system that rewards teams for being absolutely awful the season before. Does MLS, an entity that wants to catch up to the worlds best leagues, even want to stick with a system that could hold it back?
With the Superdraft slowly losing value, and big money becoming more prevalent, teams with small purses could find it challenging to stay relevant.
MLS is getting to a point where it will become difficult to rise through the ranks, but not impossible.
Minnesota United and Orlando City are two teams that have never made the playoffs in their two and four year history. Philadelphia has only qualified three times in 10 years.
Meanwhile, Atlanta is two for two in its playoff qualification, and LAFC seems set to do the same in its second season. Many of the new expansion teams show ambition to immediately join the leagues elite.
The Seattle Sounders, the Red Bulls, and Sporting Kansas City represent three other elite teams that have qualified for the playoffs in 10, 9 and eight consecutive seasons, respectively.
As the second half of the season approaches and the table starts to take shape, it appears that there is once again a cream of the crop that we have seen in the past few years.
Atlanta United, the Red Bulls, and New York City –potentially soon to be known as a “big three” in the east – started the season poorly and slowly but surely have worked their way back into a playoff position. Atlanta and the Red Bulls are even nearing striking distance of first place.
Over the past five years in the Eastern Conference, nine teams have ever failed to make the playoffs at least once (Chicago x4, Orlando x4, Montreal x3, New England x3, Philadelphia x3, Toronto x2, D.C., Columbus, NYC).
Outside of a few outliers, there has been a fairly consistent group of teams who fail to qualify, while the likes of the Red Bulls, Atlanta, New York City, and D.C. – Toronto depending on the year, as well – are consistently fighting for top spot in the East.
The west has a smaller, but more consistent group that falls below the playoff line(Houston x4, Colorado x4, San Jose x4, LA Galaxy x2, Vancouver x2, Minnesota x2, Salt Lake x2, Portland).
Of course there are caveats and outliers to this information. For example, the Galaxy’s two seasons of missing the playoffs accounts for half of qualification failures in the Galaxy’s 22 year history (18/22 in playoff qualification).
The Union, likewise, were perennial losers, but after a few front office and strategic changes, are currently in first in the East, just above fellow underdogs Montreal.
Compared to other soccer leagues, MLS is still the one with the most parity, and like many U.S. leagues has teams that are poorly run (see Cleveland Browns).
But the challenges these teams face will only get tougher as the league grows.
Just looking at last year’s average attendance shows the gap in a few teams.
Atlanta (53,002) and Seattle (40,641) are so far ahead of Columbus (12,447) and Chicago (14,806) that it would appear obvious that those two are the more successful teams, not even taking market and stadium location and size into account.
It’s tough to make predictions in sports, that’s possibly why betting is such a lucrative business. The peaks and troughs come around as unexpectedly as the stock market.
So claiming that MLS is moving toward a league with less parity is a tough one.
But given the league’s growth, ambitious new expansion teams, potential changes to the salary bill, and the myriad of ways players can enter the league, there is reason to believe that disparity will grow in the league.
Unless teams can pick up the model that made Dallas, the Red Bulls, and Philadelphia successful, or spend like the big teams, there is a real chance that there becomes a set of consistent bottom dwellers.
A Second Look 